Toleration, Non-Discrimination, Multiculturalism: The Right to Culture in Liberal Societies

Introduction

Although the concepts of multiculturalism and the right to culture have been around for years, its progress has been limited because there exists many divergent theories of multiculturalism and because the viability of multiculturalism in liberal societies has been fiercely argued.  This paper does not seek to provide a solution to these differences.  Rather, this paper seeks to comment and expound on the concepts of liberalism and multiculturalism discussed by Kymlicka[1], Raz[2], and Margalit[3] in their respective papers.  In particular, this papers attempts to open the discussion on whether there is a right to culture/multiculturalism and whether this it is viable in liberal societies.

Part  I introduces the basic principles of the right to culture as stated by these academics.  Part II examines the different levels of the right to culture, specifically toleration, non-discrimination, and multiculturalism.  Part III explores the criticisms of multiculturalism and the viability of these rights within modern liberal society.  Part IV provides comments and some possible recommendations in regards to this subject.

Part I:  Basic Principles

According to Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal, “Human beings have a right to culture – not just any culture, but their own.”[4] The culture they refer to and the culture I focus on within this paper is the culture which Kymlicka states “is a societal culture—that is, a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across a full range of human activities.”[5] This culture must include “social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.”[6]

Meaning

Yet why do individuals require a culture that is their own?  Is it not enough that they can integrate within the existing dominant culture?  The answer is no.  According to Kymlicka, integration within a culture that is not our own provides an individual with the freedom to choose various social practices, but only a culture that is one’s own provides meaning for these actions.[7]

Margalit gives us a specific example of culture that provides meaning with her Israeli national anthem narrative.  To Jews, the singing of “Hatikva”, the Israeli national anthem is deeply meaningful.  “This is a song about the Jews’ 2,000-year-old hope to return to their homeland, the land of Zion and Jerusalem, and to be a free nation there once more after their long exile.  It is exclusively Jewish.”[8] An non-Jewish individual forcefully integrated within Jewish societal culture would not understand and feel what Jewish individuals would feel when hearing this anthem.  It holds no part of their individual selves…it holds no meaning.  Vice versa, a Jewish individual immigrating to the United States would not hold the United States anthem to be meaningful.  Therefore one of the primary reasons that individuals should have a right to their own culture is because it gives their lives meaning.

Cultural Lens

Not only does one’s own culture provide meaning to one’s life, it also creates meaningful lens through which an individual makes decisions that he feels is valuable.  According to Kymlicka, “societal cultures involve ‘a shared vocabulary of tradition and convention’ which underlies a full range of social practices and institutions.”[9] Therefore, in order to understand a specific culture, one must be immersed within its traditions and conventions.  By being immersed within this “shared vocabulary”, and individual is able to make decisions which are significant for himself.  Not only does one’s culture provide a baseline from which one can sift through options, it also “provides the spectacles through which we identify experiences as valuable.”[10]

Here I will insert a personal narrative to illustrate this point.  As a Korean-American, my immersion within Korean culture has provided a “valuable lens” through which I make decisions.  One such decision would be in relationships.  Although I do not discriminate in who I befriend, there is a tendency for me to look for Korean or Korean-American significant others.  This is not because I detest the appearances or actions of other cultures.  Rather, it is because there is that “shared vocabulary” of traditions and conventions which instantly create a strong bond among individuals of the same culture.  Therefore, I am drawn more to those who are Korean or Korean-American because the lens through which I view the world makes them more attractive to me.

Entitlement to Membership

Although an individual’s culture provides meaning and lens through which to make decisions, it is also possible for other cultures to provide these same options once an individual is integrated.  This occurs most often with recent immigrants.  Of course integrating into a different culture involves effort and time…it may not happen throughout an individual’s lifetime but in the lifetime of his descendants, but it can be argued that an individual can be as connected and ingrained within a culture that is not his own.  Although this option should never be taken away from an individual, this option should also never be forced onto someone.

An individual is entitled to membership in their own culture because “In large part, we affirm our society and culture, and have an intimate and inexpressible knowledge of it, even though much of it we may question, if not reject.”[11] Our own culture is a culture we have been raised in, a culture we use to “express and understand ourselves, our aims, goals, and values.”[12] In short, we are entitled to our own culture because we are a part of it and because a part of our identity and self will be lost once we leave our own culture.

Part II:  The Different Levels of the Right to Culture

Throughout various dialogues and clashes with the different cultures introduced, liberal societies have developed different responses towards the right to culture.  These responses relate to the level in which the right to culture is protected/affirmed by a specific state.  Both Margalit and Raz share these levels of the right to culture, although Raz refers to these as responses to multiculturalism.

Toleration

Margalit states that the first level of the right to culture is “the right to maintain a comprehensive way of life within the larger society without interference, and with only the limitation of the harm principle.”[13] Raz states that the first level consists of “letting minorities conduct themselves as they wish without being criminalized, so long as they do not interfere with the culture of the majority, and with the ability of members of the majority to enjoy the life-styles of their culture.”[14] Both Margalit and Raz advocate that minorities should not be interfered with at this level so long as they do not harm or interfere with the majority culture or other outlying cultures.  Most liberal societies support toleration as a base level response to multiculturalism.

There are two main arguments for support of toleration.  The first is the Harm Principle, which states that “no one may be coerced except in order to restrain him from causing harm to others or to punish him for causing harm to others.”[15] According to this principle, actions which an individual or a culture take should not be punished as long as it does not harm others.  The second argument is an argument appealing to harmony and peace.  This argument prescribes toleration because to not allow toleration would lead to the jeopardization of the government “by the resentment and hostility of minorities which are not allowed to continue with their religious and cultural activities and practices.”[16]

The problem inherent in the policy of toleration is that it does not fully appease the minority cultures.  Although they are allowed to follow their societal cultures, their practices and activities will always be set aside if the needs or wants of the dominant culture require that space in liberal society.  Thus, this level of the right to culture has been supplemented/supplanted by recognition/non-discrimination.

Non-Discrimination / Recognition

The non-discrimination/recognition level of the right to culture includes most/all of the rights of the first level (toleration) and ‘adds the right to recognition of the community’s way of life by the general society.”[17] It is a liberal policy that asserts an individual’s rights against inequality, one of the foundations of liberalism.  Non-discrimination recognizes that a minority individual is entitled to the same rights that an individual of the dominant culture is entitled to.  Non-discrimination protects the individual against “discrimination on national, racial, ethnic, or religious grounds, or on grounds of gender or sexual preference.”[18]

According to Raz, non-discrimination and the rights that go along with it “go well beyond toleration.  They have far-reaching consequences which intrude on and affect the way the majority community leads its own life.”[19] Within this level of the right to culture, the majority is no longer able to push around minority cultures.  Legislation such as the Equal Protection Clause in the Unites States allows remedy for individuals who feel they have been discriminated because of their race, gender, etc., - essentially their societal culture.  However, non-discrimination does allow for communities to control over certain facets of society.  Country clubs can still restrict who they allow within their membership, schools can restrict admission based on academic achievements and other activities, even the government can determine who they allow to emigrate into the United States.  Therefore, although non-discrimination/recognition greatly enhance the right to culture of minority cultures in comparison to toleration, discrimination within certain private institutions and within personal interactions is tolerated.

Multiculturalism

The third approach to the right to culture for non-dominant societal cultures is the “affirmation of multiculturalism.”[20] Margalit states that this third level “includes both the previous levels and adds the right to support for the way of life by the state’s institutions so that the culture can flourish.”[21] In reference to his previous examples on Arab-Israelis and Ultra-Orthodox Jews, he demonstrates that Ultra-Orthodox Jews are supported in a way by the Israeli government that allows their societal culture to flourish whereas Arab-Israelis are permitted to exist, but are only given partial recognition and are even discriminated against at times.  Thus, the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish societal culture is given the rights to the third level of culture, while Arab-Israelis are relegated somewhere between toleration and non-discrimination.

Raz’s view of affirmation of multiculturalism is different.  For Raz, “the policy of multiculturalism differs from that which relies exclusively on non-discrimination rights in rejecting the individualist bias of the latter.”  Furthermore, Raz states that multiculturalism requires a political society (i.e. Israel, US, etc.) to “recognize the equal standing of all the stable and viable cultural communities existing in that society…a political society, a state, consists—if it is multicultural—of diverse communities and belong to none of them.”[22]

In comparing the two differing concepts of multiculturalism, Margalit appears to push for the right of minority cultures in a stronger manner than Raz does.  Rather than just advocate the equality of majority and minority cultures, Margalit goes so far as to state that minority cultures, such as Ultra-Orthodox Jews and Arab-Israelis, should be given favorable treatment and support over the majority culture.  He bases this on the assumption that the majority culture is large enough and durable enough to survive/flourish without support from the state.

For Raz, the minority culture is valuable only if it can perpetuate itself.  He states that the affirmation of multiculturalism “is advanced as suitable in those societies in which there are several stable cultural communities both wishing and able to perpetuate themselves.  It does not apply…to a country which receives many immigrants from diverse cultures, but where those from each are few in number or…do not wish to keep their separate identity.”[23] He even goes so far as to imply that the act of migrating to a host country express an individual’s rejection of their own societal culture for the dominant culture of the host country.

Part III:  Criticisms & Viability

Every discussion of multiculturalism deals with multiculturalism in liberal societies.  However, a question that has yet to be resolved is whether multiculturalism and the right to culture is truly viable in a liberal society.  Margalit begins her paper by stating that “the right to culture may involve a group whose norms cannot be reconciled with the conception of the individual in a liberal society.”[24] This sections seeks to identify the issues and possible solutions to the question of whether multiculturalism (and the right to one’s own culture) is really viable in a liberal society.

Illiberal Cultures

One of the central problems in the viability of the protection of multiculturalism and the right to culture is that certain cultures may not be completely liberal.  A culture may reduce the freedoms of an individual by forcing arranged marriages or preventing them from pursuing their own career choices or preventing them from choosing their own religion.  Margalit brings up the example of Ultra-Orthodox Jews who do not allow any work to be done on the Sabbath.  The only way for an Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community to keep this aspect of their culture is by disallowing traffic and any type of work within the neighborhood they dwell in.  Although Ultra-Orthodox Jews would be able to continue observing their Sabbath even with traffic outside, as Margalit points out, “the Sabbath atmosphere would be tainted, and it would lose its public quality.”[25] To what extent would a state have to support an illiberal culture and still be able to be multicultural and liberal?

Another problem could arise by a culture’s unwillingness to let their cultural members go.  Raz declares that a culture should not be supported/preserved when it has lost the ability to perpetuate it…“where the ossification of their culture and the allure of the surrounding cultures means that the vast majority of their young people wish to assimilate n the majority culture and rebel against their parent’s culture.”[26] However, how would the state be able to determine whether a culture can still perpetuate itself or whether the specific culture is preventing individuals from leaving for a more appealing culture, even when they want to?  That culture would be violating one of the basic principles of liberalism, that of an individual being able to pursue their own way of life, their own happiness.  Thus, multiculturalism may be prevented from integrating with liberalism because the culture that is to be supported may be illiberal.

Dominant Culture as Superior

Another criticism to the viability of the right to culture within a liberal society is the notion that the dominant culture is “dominant” because it is superior.  Why should an inferior culture be supported/perpetuated when it is too weak to exist on its own?  It is plain to see that certain cultures currently being supported by liberal societies cannot perpetuate themselves without the help of the state.  For example, within the United States, the Native American culture is own that is teetering on the brink of insolvency even with the massive support and favoritism that the United States gives it.  Critics of multiculturalism would state that the Native American culture is inferior.  Even with the support of the federal government (allowing them to build gambling sites for support of their culture - favoritism in prospective admissions to both private and public universities, favoritism in hiring - ), there is mounting evidence that it is all for naught.  Education within Native American reservations is atrocious, there are rampant problems with substance abuse, and profits from the casinos (given directly to members of their respective tribes) dissuade adult Native American from ever obtaining jobs.  By all accounts, the Native American culture in the United States is, although not originally meant to be, a failed attempt at multiculturalism.

Both Kymlicka and Raz believe that a culture that cannot perpetuate itself should not be supported/perpetuated as long as the individual members can successfully integrate within the dominant culture.  However, Margalit disagrees with this concept of “only cultures who can flourish should be allowed to survive.”  In his view, “the individual’s right to culture stems from the fact that every person has an overriding interest in his personality identity-that is, in preserving his way of life and the traits that are central identity components for him and the other members of his cultural group.”[27] Margalit argues that Kymlicka things of minority cultures as alternatives which lose their usefulness when they are no longer sustainable.  Margalit, on the other hand, maintains that one’s own culture, although unsustainable, is still valuable and necessary because an individual within that culture thinks and makes decisions through the lens of that culture.  Once that culture is gone, then they as individuals become flawed.  Thus for Margalit, even if a culture is deemed a failure/flawed/deficient in some manner, there is still a need to sustain it, at least for the individual members who associate with that culture.

Common Culture as Necessary

The third argument/criticism of the concept of an individual’s right to their own culture or multiculturalism is the notion that a common culture is necessary for a state to survive.  Raz states that critics of multiculturalism believe that without a common culture, “society will fall apart…living in one political society entails a willingness to suffer for the sake of other members of society.”[28] Thus, minority cultures should suffer and integrate rather than fracture the political entity by perpetuating themselves.

Although this criticism may ring true, it does not appear as if acceptance of different cultures within one state sufficiently damages the capabilities of that state that it weakens it.  Supporting the French-Canadian culture within Canada does not seem to diminish Canada’s reputation as a developed, liberal state.  There are no indications that Canadian society is falling apart.  Nor does the support of Ultra-Orthodox communities within Israel seem to affect Israel’s standing as a country significantly.

Viability

Is multiculturalism and the right to one’s own culture viable in a liberal society?  If considering the ideals of liberalism and multiculturalism, the answer is that it is not viable.  The support of individuals in a minority culture over the support of the majority culture in itself creates issues with the liberal idea of equality.  The perpetuation of illiberal cultures which may restrict individual freedom or choices go against the strong ideals of liberalism.  So no, in terms of reconciling an ideal multicultural state and an ideal liberal state, integration of these two philosophies is not viable.  However, I argue that a liberal society cannot exist without concepts of multiculturalism.  Rather, a liberal society cannot uphold its principals of liberalism unless, through compromises, it integrates concepts of multiculturalism within it.  The liberal principles of equality and freedom necessitate the integration of multiculturalism in modern society.

Equality

In addition, in order to makes these individuals equal before the state, toleration or non-discrimination of the culture is not enough.  With toleration, these individuals would have to make do with aspects of their culture which do not contradict or interfere with the aspects of the dominant culture.  Non-discrimination would allow these individuals to stand equal before the law, but only to the extent to which the dominant culture allows them to stand equal.  For a higher level of equality, a political state would have to adopt Raz’s idea of the affirmation of multiculturalism, where the state would recognize the equal standing of all viable cultural communities.  It would indeed have to be a political society/state that consists of diverse states but belonging to none of them.[29] In essence, there would have to be no discussion of dominant and minority cultures but rather of cultures without any tag attached.  Therefore, for a liberal state to treat all individuals equal, they would have to not only allow the right to one’s own culture but support it as well.

Freedom

Not only does a liberal society need to support the right to culture in terms of promoting equality, it must also promote the right to culture because of each individual’s freedom.  Freedom in the context of liberalism has many avenues.  There is the freedom to have divergent beliefs, the freedom to be mobile, the freedom to choose one’s own vocation, etc.  For this paper, the freedom to choose one’s own path in life is the most important aspect that a liberal state must deal with.

When picturing a state which only permits the dominant culture, the freedom to choose one’s path in life is rather limited.  Because an individual has been exposed to only one culture, the choices and individual can make in terms of their life are limited because they have no perspectives of other options.  In essence, multiculturalism and the freedom to one’s own culture is important because it is through this lens that a person bases their decisions.  According to Kymlicka, “for meaningful individual choice to be possible, individuals need not only access to information, the capacity to reflectively evaluate it, and the freedom of expression and association.  They also need access to a societal culture.”  Furthermore, they require access to the societal culture of their choice because making decisions based on a culture forced upon them would make it a flawed choice.  Of course, Margalit’s argument that illiberal cultures which do not allow individuals to freely move in and out of their own culture would also not further the principle of freedom in a liberal society.

Part IV:  Comments/Conclusion

In considering this discussion of the right to culture and liberalism, it is important to realize that compromises must be made between the two camps for multiculturalism to be viable in a liberal society.  Raz is mostly correct in his statements that cultures that cannot survive on their own should be allowed to disappear.  If a culture cannot perpetuate itself, no matter how much support a state gives it, its ability to survive remains static and thus is a waste of public resources to perpetuate.  Additionally, not only should a culture be able to perpetuate itself, a culture should also have to appeal to the descendants of that culture in order to support its existence within a state.  That is, a culture should not perpetuate itself through the forced inclusion of its members’ descendants.  Rather, it should be appealing to these progeny; it should be worthwhile in their eyes in order to be worthy of support.

However, it is highly unlikely that a state will ever be created without a dominant culture.  Kymlicka correctly assumes that there is a common culture that s state acquires.  This common identity is what ties the state together and many aspects of that common culture are acquired from the dominant culture.  This does not mean that the common culture is not compatible with the various minority cultures.  However, in order for these minority cultures to be supported by the state, it would most likely have to support or at least tolerate the common culture of the state.  Thus, Raz’ argument that a liberal state supporting multiculturalism must not have a dominant culture is difficult to support.

Rather, a liberal culture should support minority cultures actively and continuously in order to create a semi-equal atmosphere.  This goes in line with Margalit’s proposition that the state should not remain neutral to minority cultures and should actively support them.  Critics state that actively supporting minority cultures results in a discrimination of the majority culture.  Although this stands true from a theoretical standpoint, it is necessary to realize that most of the policies, laws, and positions of the political state although seemingly neutral actually passively support the dominant culture.  Especially in democratic states such as the United States, the majority culture usually has the greatest voice in politics and in decision-making.  Thus, it is assumed that they have an advantage over minority cultures.  Therefore, the state should actively support minority cultures because they are already at a disadvantage. That being said, I would propose to liberal states that they adopt a position in which the absolute minimum level of multiculturalism is on the level of non-discrimination, and that they should strive to incorporate as many elements of an affirmation of multiculturalism as possible.

[1] Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship  (1996).

[2] Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 155-176 (Clarendon Press 1994).

[3] Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, 71 Soc. Res. 529 (2004).

[4] Margalit at 1.

[5] Kymlicka, at 76.

[6] Id.

[7] Id., at 83.

[8] Margalit, at 3.

[9] Kymlicka, at 83.

[10] Id.

[11] Rawls 1993a: 222, supra Kymlicka.

[12] Id.

[13] Margalit, at 6.

[14] Raz, at 157.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Margalit, at 6.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Raz, at 158.

[21] Margalit, at 6.

[22] Raz, at 159.

[23] Id., at 158.

[24] Margalit, at 1.

[25] Id., at 11.

[26] Raz, at 158.

[27] Margalit, at 10.

[28] Raz, at 160.

[29] Raz, at 159.